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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION  






In a number of cases, integration of a 
large international region or an interstate 
union can only be promoted by political 
means. The policy of regional economic 
convergence prevails in many sectors. The 
single economic market and membership 
in economic and monetary unions give a 
new impetus to consolidation. The study 
aims to identify and explore the problems 
of political governance, which the Union 
State of Russia-Belarus faces due to their 
asymmetric and not completely compati-
ble economies. The author analyzes the 
process of interstate convergence, consid-
ering it as an essential part of integration 
and explores a number of specific charac-
teristics underlying the Russian — Bela-
rusian economic integration. The author 
offers a set of criteria of convergence/not 
convergence of the states, describes the 
principles of their economic and political 
rapprochement and offers models of con-
vergence as well as prerequisites for 
them. The article examines the principles 
that determine the participation of a coun-
try in international integration as well as 
prospects for the further development of 
the regional economic and political me-
chanisms, which are being formed now. 
Based on the given economic indicators, 
the author gives a forecast for the deve-
lopment of the union state. 
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...The present political necessity ought to be 
no concern of the economic scientist. His task 
ought to be, as I will not cease repeating, to 
make politically possible what today may be 
politically impossible. To decide what can be 
done at the moment is the task of the politician, 
not of the economist... 
Friedrich A. Hayek 
 
 
Amid the ongoing academic discussion on the applicability of this or that 
model of economic and political integration, it is important to stress that 
each ‘model’ corresponds to a certain type of economic and political organi-
sation of a state [13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. 
Today, it is difficult to refute the positive effect of integration on the so-
cioeconomic development of participating countries. The convergence of 
socioeconomic development of involved countries is a major objective for 
the participants of the integration process [10]. The economic relations of 
economic systems are determined not by their geographical proximity or re-
moteness but by the level of economic affinity. This thesis should be recog-
nised as the principle of economic integration. 
Additivity means that common efforts of two groups will yield the same 
or a better result than the one that would be achieved by separate production. 
It seems quite obvious that uniting never leads to weakening. However, it is 
not always evident, since this concept suggests that the two groups can go into 
production separately. The positive effects of the additivity factor are coupled 
with the diminishing return accounted for by the limitedness of factors. 
As a rule, changes at ‘deeper levels’ are more complicated than those at 
‘surface levels’. However, the latter are sometimes impossible without the 
former, which is one of the reasons of institutional stability, and an obstacle 
to changes. These circumstances create a situation termed ‘spillover effect’ 
by Leon Lindberg. It takes place when ‘a given action related to a specific 
goal creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by tak-
ing further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for 
more action, and so forth’ [16, p. 10]. The actual political processes show 
that this effect does not appear on its own, but rather it requires a political 
incentive, which cannot always be provided by the actor. 
The Russia-Belarus union aims to crate the most advanced mechanism in 
the CIS for the economic integration of the two states based on building a 
unique economic and social space. At the same time, one cannot exclude that 
the adjustment of the common economic mechanism can be stalled by politi-
cal infighting. As is well known, at the stage when economies are given a 
‘boost’ to satisfy the ‘conformity criteria’, countries have to deal with seri-
ous discrepancies in budget deficit, interest rates, etc. Thus, it is very unclear 
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how coordinated the actions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Belarus will be in the conditions when all major economic leverages are de-
legated to supranational bodies designed to shape and implement a common 
economic policy. The ensuing loss of economic sovereignty — which is the 
point of discussion here — can become an additional source of tension. 
In 2000—2012, the trade turnover of the Republic of Belarus was steadi-
ly increasing (table). Despite the 2009—2010 decrease, unprecedented re-
sults were attained in 2012 — a 5.7-fold increase over the 2000 level. As 
both fig. 2 and the table show, Russia accounts for most of Belarus’s trade 
turnover. In 2015, trade with Belarus comprised 4.5 % of Russian exports 
(34.7 % of that to the CIS countries), Ukraine 2.7 % (20.8 % to the CIS), and 
Kazakhstan 3.2 % (24.2 % to the CIS). As to imports, Belarus accounted for 
4.9 % (43 % of Russian imports from the CIS), Ukraine for 3.1 % (27.3 % 
from the CIS), and Kazakhstan for 2.7 % (23.5 % from the CIS). Note that, 
since 2000, the proportion of Belarus in Russia’s trade with the CIS has been 
increasing, and that in exports decreasing, although a positive trend has been 




Fig. 1. Changes in the trade turnover of the Republic of Belarus, % as of 2000 
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Structure of Russia’s trade with the CIS countries,% 
 
Parameter 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Exports 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Including trade 
with the EAEU 
countries 57.68 52.93 51.06 51.50 54.40 54.94 59.40 62.38 
By country: 
Azerbaijan 0.98 2.63 2.62 3.15 3.59 3.98 5.27 5.11 
Armenia 0.20 0.59 1.17 0.99 1.16 1.35 1.71 2.34 
Belarus 40.28 31.01 30.34 31.38 31.67 27.36 32.20 34.71 
Georgia 0.31 1.08 - - - - - - 
Kazakhstan 16.25 20.00 17.94 17.75 19.81 23.85 22.06 24.20 
Kyrgyzstan 0.75 1.22 1.66 1.46 2.06 2.74 2.72 2.90 
Moldova 1.52 1.37 1.86 1.87 2.03 1.79 2.31 2.31 
Tajikistan 0.40 0.74 1.13 0.91 0.86 0.98 1.39 1.70 
Turkmenistan 0.94 0.69 1.27 1.45 1.53 1.93 1.81 2.04 
Uzbekistan 1.98 2.64 3.17 2.65 2.93 3.79 4.88 4.99 
Ukraine 36.34 38.01 38.84 38.39 34.35 32.21 26.67 20.76 
Imports 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Including trade 
with the EAEU 
countries 53.74 48.33 47.31 47.88 53.54 51.82 78.90 67.52 
By country: 
Azerbaijan 1.16 1.08 1.22 1.28 1.26 1.65 1.94 2.49 
Armenia 0.38 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.67 0.91 0.96 0.95 
Belarus 31.97 30.09 31.37 32.36 30.56 36.18 46.78 42.96 
Georgia 0.66 0.83 - - - - - - 
Kazakhstan 18.96 16.98 14.02 14.67 22.39 15.26 22.54 23.46 
Kyrgyzstan 0.76 0.77 1.24 0.65 0.44 0.29 0.22 0.34 
Moldova 2.80 2.88 1.33 1.05 1.06 1.08 0.96 0.89 
Tajikistan 2.04 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.25 
Turkmenistan 4.08 0.41 0.47 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.28 0.35 
Uzbekistan 5.71 4.76 4.91 4.14 3.10 3.26 2.67 2.89 
Ukraine 31.46 41.16 44.27 44.88 39.97 40.92 32.77 27.27 
 
Calculations based on [6]. 
 
This parameter comes useful in analysing the closeness of economic ties. 
However, it is important to make several reservations. 
— Unilateral trade relations and narrow economic diversification pose a 
potential economic threat. If a crisis arises in the counteragent country, it 
will also affect the other state. 
— If the integration agreements are fully implemented, the export poten-
tial of Belarus will decrease by the above magnitude, since this proportion of 
external trade turnover will be redefined as internal trade. 





Fig. 2. Russia-Belarus bilateral trade (exports/imports) in 2015 prices (USD billion) 
 
Based on [1; 5]. 
 
Russia and Belarus are building a common economic and social space 
with uniform (and prospectively common) mechanisms for economic regula-
tion based on market principles. However, it is still early to declare uni-
formity in this respect. 
For many years, the Russian-Belarusian integration process has been 
dominated by an intergovernmental approach, which cannot always guaran-
tee foreign policy cohesion and internal consolidation [11]. 
It is important to understand that achieving the actual economic and — 
especially — social cohesion will take a long time despite the declared but 
doubtful growth in each of the states. Moreover, a significant proportion of 
unification spending will be accounted for by internal — primarily Russian — 
sources without any restitution guarantee. At the same time, it is important to 
identify the level of economic cohesion, which requires outlining the paths 
of convergence and relevant economic policy regimes. Political efforts cre-
ate the necessary framework, but they are not decisive in attaining purely 
economic goals [7, 8, 9]. 
Recent transition experiences provide new materials for theoretical inter-
pretations of transition economies. An analysis shows that despite the partic-
ularities of transition in former socialist republics such processes cannot be 
considered in isolation from the global development patterns [12]. They have 
certain universal features: the formation of a modern economic mechanism; 
increasing internationalisation of economic ties; the need for human factor 
development, etc. Moreover, there are certain similarities in transition pro-
cesses across the world. 
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— The Russian Federation, Belarus, and any other CIS country are fac-
ing the need to ensure high economic growth rates to catch up with devel-
oped industrial states. 
— The central element of transition is institutional changes, which is ex-
plained by a relatively high proportion of public property. 
— An important benchmark is the development of an economic mecha-
nism based on recognising the equality of all types of ownership. 
What policy should be pursued by Russia and Belarus to accelerate con-
vergence and avoid the non-market movements of production factors (capital 
and labour)? As of today, actual unification mechanisms function very poor-
ly, since 
— the current integration policy pegs prices and salaries to national borders; 
— the declarations of Union goals do not describe development mecha-
nisms to achieve them, for instance, the economic measures to manage the 
intra-union migration; 
— there are no developed approaches to the unification of tax and cur-
rency exchange rules and their impact on economy. 
Recognising these facts is crucial, since without a complete understand-
ing of all the problems the governance of the economic and monetary union 
will be very complicated. Probably, such recognition will result in a policy 
that does not focus solely on factor movements. 
This work is an attempt to answer the above questions and propose pos-
sible scenarios of economic integration. 
The integration process would be accelerated, if salaries were equalised. 
Salary equalisation can be identified with eliminating employment and pro-
duction subsidies. Nevertheless, this plan cannot be implemented without a 
policy aimed at salary and price flexibility. A solution is salary differentia-
tion, which affects migration rates. However, such initiatives would slow 
down the exchange of intra-union investment and stall the growth of the al-
ready common economy (investment generation in the post-Soviet countries 
has a very specific feature — a large proportion of cost is accounted for by 
the non-manufacturing sector in these countries, which is fraught with vari-
ous risks). Another possible solution is unemployment or unemployment 
period differentiation. In this case, salary subsidies would become an effec-
tive instrument for regulating migration. Any of the above variants would 
involve financial movement. The only way to avoid such movements is a 
self-support policy, i. e. equalising costs per labour unit across the common 
economic space. Even if all areas of the economy are harmonised (except for 
international productivity, which is extremely difficult to attain), factor 
movements will still take place. Supposedly, these movements will be of 
non-market nature. 
Note that no large investment is needed to support a regular growth in 
production; however, it should increase steadily. This very circumstance 
gave the name to the accelerator principle. 
It is important to address the dynamic theory by R. Harrod who proposed 
a model reflecting the instability of growth. If, over a certain period, invest-
ment exceeds level I necessary to maintain growth, future production capaci-
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ties will be excessive, unless future investment diverges further from the 
level determined by the existing rate. Thus, a combined effect of a multiplier 
and an accelerator leads to instability, which underlies numerous theories of 
economic fluctuations. The above model describes explosive instability ra-
ther than economic fluctuations. In effect, a physical ‘divergence’ of an 
economy is impossible, since different forces will work against the accelera-
tor effect. 
Models suggesting subsidies to individual factors of production are su-
bject to criticism, since they tacitly change relative factor prices without af-
fecting market prices, i. e. they unbalance the cost/price and invest-
ment/savings system. Price and production levels should be compatible — if 
prices increase dramatically while the amount of monetary resources remains 
unchanged, the interest rate will follow the change in prices. This situation 
will ensue reduced interest in investment. Therefore, production can only 
diminish, for otherwise the established consumption habits will result in ex-
cessive savings. 
An analysis of the current macroeconomic situation and a relevant fore-
cast for unification should be carried out based on investment flows. How-
ever, one could not expect considerable intra-union investment, since there 
are no incentives to allocate money to the neighbouring country, where 
growth rates are not much higher than at home. Moreover, any investment 
would be very sensitive to the current and expected production output and 
interest rates. Thus the, ‘productivity differentiation’ factor impedes invest-
ment, which can pose a threat to the unification process [15]. 
One of the key factors affecting a common economy will be the prepara-
tion for the rouble adoption in Belarus and the unification of currency ex-
change rules. It is expected that, at the preparation stage, the exchange rate 
of the smaller country’s currency will plummet. Naturally, financial move-
ment will be inevitable in Belarus. Theoretically, such movements should be 
financed through the unification of tax systems, since private savings would 
be insufficient. In other words, capital in the smaller country requires tempo-
rary diversification of internal production through the consumption of goods 
and capital. Consumption deficit can be overcome by imports from the larger 
country financed by loans from Russia. In this case, income deficit will turn 
into current deficit. This is not likely to have a profound effect on the ex-
change rate of the Belarusian rouble. However, when the effect of tax unifi-
cation reaches its maximum, the internal proportion of permanent income 
and consumption will return to previous levels and the external proportion 
(i. e. purely foreign assets and relevant earnings) will account for deficit fi-
nancing. Since this situation implies a decrease in permanent income caused 
by a reduction in foreign income, the equilibrium can be restored based on 
the initial exchange rate only if the marginal propensity to import remains 
the same. In other words, this will be feasible if imports decrease at the same 
rate as the foreign income of Belarus does. Unfortunately, the marginal pro-
pensity to import is rather low in Belarus. Thus, the country’s leadership 
should either preserve trade deficit or let the Belarusian rouble plummet. 
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Studies show that a 1.8 % increase in the effective interest rate in any 
CIS country (or a 3 % increase during stagnation or depression) results in an 
average 0.5 % increase in that in Russia. On the other hand, the same calcu-
lations suggest a possibility of a 15—20 % reduction in the competitive abil-
ity of the Belarusian economy during 10 years following the unification. The 
costs to be borne by the CIS partners of the union are also significant (esti-
mated at 27—36 % of the total unification costs). Thus, the official forecasts 
declaring a 5—10 year convergence period appear to be overly optimistic. 
Financing the process of economic convergence can and should be based 
on the assumption about the low absorption capacity of their financial sys-
tems. The absorption capacity can be described as the amount of community 
financial assistance a country can receive without a significant increase in 
inflation and pressure on the national budget. The absorption capacity crite-
rion has not been used in the Russian-Belarusian economic union so far. 
However, its introduction is a key element of any cohesion policy. 
There are numerous forecasts for the further development of countries 
with a transit economy and none of them predicts a continuing decline in 
production. Such forecasts are based on the assumption that economic de-
velopment will be consistent, whereas external shocks will be avoided. 
However, one cannot completely exclude the possibility of unfavourable de-
velopment, even if most post-socialist states have secured an economic 
growth (although growth rates differ significantly across the CIS). 
When developing and analysing the criteria for economic convergence 
(or divergence) between states, it is important to remember the three major 
hypotheses explaining the absence of convergence. 
The first one suggests that leaders in technology benefit from the produc-
tion technology — economies of scale make the rich richer. The second ar-
gues that convergence exists only in countries with an adequate human capi-
tal capable of mastering modern technology. According to the third one, 
poor countries have a low potential, although they develop more rapidly 
when the gap between the current income and economic growth potential 
increases. Any of the above hypotheses — if proved applicable to the Rus-
sian-Belarusian economic union — would mean a medium feasibility of 
economic convergence processes, since economic growth and economic 
convergence require developed economic institutions. Countries with a 
closed economy, where rights to property are not safeguarded, are dominated 
by non-market methods to protect national commodity and financial mar-
kets. Their national currencies are either non-convertible or currency conver-
sion is restricted. Such states will demonstrate low convergence rates, re-
gardless of the national level of production and technology and the initial 
human capital. A primarily declarative integration promotion policy para-
doxically impedes convergence within an international region and widens 
the gap between governments’ political efforts and the capacities of national 
economies. 
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